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Abstract: In twelve sessions conducted in a typical bubble-generating experimental environment, we 
design a pair of assets that can detect both irrationality and speculative behavior. The specific form of 
irrationality we investigate is probability judgment error associated with low-probability, high-payoff 
outcomes. Independently, we test for speculation by comparing prices of identically paying assets in 
multiperiod versus single-period markets. When these tests indicate the presence of probability judgment 
error and speculation, bubbles are more likely to occur. This finding suggests that both factors are 
important bubble drivers. 
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Although laboratory asset markets have yielded key insights into asset pricing, 
some results are perplexing.
1 Perhaps most striking is that in one particular, multi-period 
market structure, price tends to bubble above risk-neutral asset value and subsequently 
crash.  Speculation and/or irrationality have been suggested as likely bubble ingredients.    
This paper further investigates bubbles by designing markets for securities whose prices 
can be used to detect both irrational and speculative behavior.  The specific form of 
irrationality we investigate is probability judgment error associated with low-probability 
high-payoff events.  We examine the price difference between two assets whose dividend 
distributions are nearly identical over all outcomes except for the upper tail, to see 
whether subjects are making this type of error.  We measure speculative behavior by 
comparing asset prices in multi-period markets to prices in single period markets.  In  
multi-period markets there is an opportunity to speculate across periods.  Such 
speculation is not possible in single period markets.  Our experimental results are that 
both speculative activity and probability judgment errors are present in sessions where 
bubbles occur. 
We employ a market structure, first discovered by Smith, Suchanek, and Williams 
(1988), in which participants trade an asset that pays a dividend each period for a finite 
number of periods.  Since the dividend-generating process and the number of periods are 
known to all traders, the risk-neutral value is easily computed as the expected one-period 
dividend times the number of trading periods remaining.  Despite this transparency, 
Smith, Suchanek and Williams frequently observe asset price bubbles, and conclude that 
common knowledge about the dividend process is not sufficient to guarantee common 
expectations.  “Each trader may be uncertain as to the behavior of others with the same 
information” (page 1120), and this type of uncertainty can lead to speculative bubbles.  A 
rational trader may knowingly purchase the asset for a high price (relative to risk-neutral 
                                                           
1 Hundreds of laboratory markets are reported in the literature.  See Davis and Holt (1993) and Kagel and 
Roth (1995) for introductions to this literature.   2
value) if she believes that the asset can be sold later at an even higher price to another 
trader.
2 
Lei, Noussair and Plott (2001) further investigate this rational speculation 
hypothesis by conducting experiments with a similar market structure, adding a treatment 
where the participants are restricted to acting as either buyers or sellers of the asset.  Even 
though this treatment entirely eliminates the opportunity to speculate, they still observe 
frequent bubbles.  Lei, Noussair and Plott therefore conclude that the ability to speculate 
is not necessary for bubble formation, and that at least some of the traders are behaving 
irrationally in this environment.   
Remaining issues concern both the nature of traders’ irrationality, and the 
connection between some traders’ irrational behavior and other traders’ speculative 
activity.  Lei, Noussair and Plott (2001) suggest that trader confusion, coupled with the 
fact that traders don’t have anything else to occupy themselves with during the 
experiment, is responsible for increased trading volume, with some traders paying too 
much for the shares, which can then lead to bubble formation.  Although this is a 
plausible explanation, it is unlikely to apply outside the laboratory.  And yet, given 
financial market behavior over the last decade, many observers believe that bubbles are a 
real-world phenomenon. 
Other experimental work indicates that many individuals exhibit bias when 
confronted with choices involving small probabilities and large payoffs.
3  Irrationality 
stemming from this behavioral bias is often termed probability judgment error.  We 
introduce the possibility that this form of irrationality will be displayed by creating an 
asset that has a very low probability of a large dividend payout each period.   
Additionally, subjects can trade a “truncated” asset.  This asset pays the same large 
                                                           
2 Much subsequent research has varied the market structure, trader characteristics and/or asset 
characteristics of Smith, Suchanek and Williams (1988).  Some examples of market structure variations 
include: price limits (King, Smith, Williams and Van Boening (1993)), futures (Porter and Smith (1995)), 
short sales (King, Smith, Williams and Van Boening (1993), Haruvy and Noussair (2004) and Ackert, 
Charupat, Church and Deaves (2005a)), and a call market clearing system (Van Boening, Williams and 
LaMaster (1993)).  Examples of trader/asset characteristic variations include: certain dividends (Porter and 
Smith (1995)), lottery-type assets (Ackert, Charupat, Church and Deaves (2005a)), larger-scale markets 
(Williams (2005)), and trader experience (King, Smith, Williams and Van Boening (1993) and Ackert and 
Church (2001)). 
3 Kahneman and Tversky (1979) document this bias using surveys.  See Camerer (1995) for a survey and 
synthesis of related individual choice experiments.     3
dividend with the same probability as does the “untruncated” asset, but the number of 
such dividend payouts is limited.  Despite these conditions, the risk-neutral values of the 
two assets are almost always identical.  The exact difference depends on the number of 
periods remaining, but, with the parameters used in our markets, the difference in values 
is generally much less than a penny.  Therefore a non-trivial difference between the 
untruncated asset price and the truncated asset price can serve as a litmus test for the 
existence of probability judgment error.
4  Indeed our results show a correlation between 
the frequency (and magnitude) of bubbles and the presence of this form of irrationality.  
While our findings support Lei, Noussair and Plott’s (2001) conclusion that irrationality 
is an ingredient in bubble formation, our results also suggest that the irrationality leading 
to bubble formation need not be trader confusion. 
Although Lei, Noussair and Plott (2001) find that bubbles occur in treatments 
where speculation is not possible, they do not exclude speculation as an important factor 
in laboratory bubbles.  Their conclusion is simply that “any explanation of the bubble 
phenomenon, which relies on the possibility of speculation, does not provide a complete 
account” (page 857).  They conjecture that experimental asset market bubbles evolve 
through stages.  At the beginning, some traders behave irrationally. As the experiment 
progresses, other traders realize that there are irrational traders.  This realization promotes 
speculation.  Later, traders learn from experience and practice, and irrationality subsides, 
causing the market to crash.  Their explanation suggests that bubbles are characterized by 
interplay between irrational and speculative behavior.  Our experiment further 
investigates this issue. 
In order to study the link between irrational behavior and potential speculation, 
we design a second litmus test for speculative behavior.  Our subjects participate not just 
in a standard multi-period market, but also in several single period markets, each with 
more than one dividend draw.  For example, a stock trading in an n-draw single period 
market has the same risk-neutral value as one trading in a multi-period market with n 
periods remaining, when dividends are drawn according to the same distribution.  The 
principal difference is that the latter has much greater speculative trading potential.   
Comparisons of asset prices across multi-period and single period markets allow us to 
                                                           
4 As will be discussed later, other interpretations are possible.     4
test for speculative activity.  If speculation is an important ingredient in bubble 
formation, we expect these differences to be correlated with the frequency (and 
magnitude) of bubbles (in the multi-period markets).  The results reported here support 
this view. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II presents the 
experimental design.  The hypotheses to be tested are set out and motivated in the next 
section.  The experimental results are reported in Section IV, with discussion following in 





II. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
 
A. The computerized environment 
The experiment reported here was conducted using a computerized double auction 
market program which allows students to transact in real time over a number of market 
periods.
5  Traders receive initial endowments made up of cash and securities.     
Participants can post bids and asks, or act as price-takers by accepting the best posted bid 
or ask.  Share and cash balances are automatically updated after transactions and dividend 
payments.  For this experiment, traders transact one share at a time and the order book 
has a depth of one, which means that posted orders are erased by better bids and asks. 
  
B. Experimental assets 
Each of the 12 experimental sessions consists of three distinct markets.  A multi-
period market runs over 10 trading periods.  At the end of each period, assets pay a 
randomly determined dividend.  Cash balances and asset holdings carry forward across 
the 10 periods.  After the final dividends are paid out at the end of period 10, all assets 
are worthless because no further dividends are to be paid.  We refer to the multi-period 
                                                           
5 The Financial Trading System (FTS) platform, developed by S. Srivastava and J. O’Brien at Carnegie 
Mellon University, was used for this experiment.   5
market as MP-10.  In the other two markets, the assets trade for only a single period.  In 
these markets, the payoffs to the assets are determined by a series of random draws.  One 
single period market has a series of eight random draws; the other has five random draws.  
These single period markets are referred to as SP-8 and SP-5, respectively. 
Our experiment features two types of assets in all markets.  Both assets have 
lottery-like characteristics (though to varying degrees).
6  The first type of share, labeled 
A, pays a dividend based on a random draw from an opaque jar containing 98 red chips 
and 2 black chips.  If a red chip is drawn, the payout is zero, but, if a black chip is drawn, 
the payout is $20.  For expositional purposes only, we call this asset “untruncated.”  In 
the MP-10 market, there is a single draw at the end of each of the ten trading periods.  A 
$20 dividend is paid if a black chip is selected, and no dividend is paid if a red chip is 
selected.  One could receive $200 per share over the multi-period market, though this is a 
near-zero probability event.  In the SP-8 market there are eight independent draws (with 
replacement) at the end of the one and only trading period. The payoff per share is equal 
to $20 times the number of black chips drawn.  Similarly, in the SP-5 market, there are 
five independent draws.   
The second type of asset, labeled B, is similar to asset A except that the total 
payoff is limited as follows.  Asset B pays $20 when a black chip is drawn only if fewer 
than three black chips have been previously drawn.  This implies that the maximum 
cumulative payoff from holding a share of asset B is $60.  The same upper bound on 
cumulative payout holds for the SP-5 and SP-8 versions of B.  Again, for expositional 
purposes only, we call this asset “truncated.”  In addition to being intertemporally 
independent, dividend draws are also cross-sectionally independent.  There are separate 
(independent) draws to determine the dividends for each type of asset.   
Note that the risk-neutral values of the untruncated and truncated assets are 
virtually identical if one or fewer black chips has previously been drawn, but if two or 
more black chips have been drawn the values can diverge.  Table 1 summarizes the risk-
neutral value of each asset by draws remaining and the number of black chips already 
drawn. 
                                                           
6 Ackert, Charupat, Church and Deaves (2005a) report that traders will pay higher prices for an asset 
having lottery characteristics (i.e., a claim on a large, though unlikely, payoff) in a bubble market 
environment.   6
 
[INSERT TABLE 1] 
 
C. Conduct of sessions 
Sessions required roughly two and one-half hours.  All participants were 
sophomore, junior, or senior undergraduate business or economics students, and were 
inexperienced in that none had participated in an earlier session.  On arrival, subjects 
were provided with a set of instructions.  The experimental instructions are included in 
Appendix 1.  They were informed that they were to be given a $15 attendance fee, and 
told that their total compensation for participation would include the fee, plus profits 
accrued while trading in three distinct and different markets.  Participants were given 
about 20 minutes to read through the instructions, and then the experimenters provided an 
extensive recap, while addressing all procedural and technical questions.  After 
answering all questions, trading commenced.  Although participants were informed that 
the session would include three distinct markets, they were not informed of the order in 
advance.
7 
At the start of each market, subjects received a loan of $40 that was returned at 
the end of the market.  They were also endowed with two shares of both the untruncated 
asset (A) and the truncated asset (B), which were referred to in the experiment as stocks 
A and B, respectively.  All trading periods lasted for five minutes.  At the end of each 
trading period, dividends were determined by random draws.  Any dividends paid were 
added to shareholders’ balances.  In addition, four items of information (per security) 
were announced and publicly recorded, namely the closing price (assuming a trade 
occurred), the dividend (which was usually zero), the expected remaining cumulative 
dividend, and the maximum total cumulative dividend (the maximum dividend per period 
multiplied by the number of periods remaining).  Then about one minute was provided 
for subjects to consider their strategies, after which the session moved forward.  At the 
end of each market, each subject’s final cash balance was privately displayed on his or 
her computer screen.  If a subject’s total losses exceeded the $15 attendance fee as of the 
                                                           
7 The order of the markets within the session was randomized across sessions.   7
end of any market, she was not allowed to participate in any remaining markets.
8  
Further, if, after deducting the $40 initial cash endowment, a trader’s profit at the end of a 
session was negative, the attendance fee was reduced dollar for dollar.  After completion 
of the experiment, subjects were paid in cash, with the average total compensation over 




III. HYPOTHESES  
 
Because the risk-neutral values of the untruncated and truncated assets in the 
multi-period markets are virtually identical, in the absence of irrationality associated with 
probability judgment error, the prices of the two assets at any point in time should also be 




Hypothesis 1: At any time, the difference between the price of the 
untruncated asset and the price of the truncated asset is positive.
 11 
 
As argued above, irrationality may seed bubbles.  If so, one would expect to see a 
greater gap between untruncated and truncated asset prices in bubble markets than in 
markets which fail to bubble.  We conjecture that irrationality in one dimension 
(untruncated vs. truncated price differences) is associated with irrationality in another 
dimension (bubble formation).  To investigate this conjecture, experimental markets are 
separated into two groups according to the existence, magnitude and duration of price 
bubbles. (This will be discussed in more detail in the next section).  The first group of 
                                                           
8 This bankruptcy rule is necessary so that risk is not distorted because of a subject’s limited liability.  In 
sessions 3, 7, 8, and 9, two or more subjects went bankrupt after the multi-period market. 
9 The experimental sessions were run at ???????? University in Canada.  All dollars were Canadian. 
10 Although payment of dividends can cause the risk-neutral values of the truncated and untruncated assets 
to differ, this was not a problem in the present experiment. The expected values never diverged by more 
than a penny.  On three occasions only (and then only for a single period) did this one-penny divergence 
occur (sessions 1 and 10 after a dividend was received in period 3, and session 10 again after a (second) 
dividend was received in period 8). 
11 All hypotheses to be tested are stated in their alternative forms.  Naturally the null hypotheses are the 
complements of the alternatives.  Here, for example, the null of no probability judgment error is that “the 
difference between the price of the untruncated asset and the truncated asset is less than or equal to zero.”   8
sessions consists of those in which the observed prices of the two assets are generally 
above their risk-neutral values, and the second group consists of sessions in which the 
observed prices of the two assets are generally close to their risk-neutral values.  The 
second hypothesis is: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The magnitude of the difference between the price of the 
untruncated asset and the price of the truncated asset is larger in bubble 
sessions than in no-bubble sessions. 
 
Speculative behavior as a bubble-inducing force is also investigated here.  To this 
end, we compare prices of assets in the multi-period markets, where speculation across 
periods is possible, to the corresponding prices observed in single period markets, where 
the scope for speculation is quite limited.  If speculative activity is present, we would 
expect that prices of (both) assets in multi-period markets should be higher than 
corresponding prices in single period markets.  This leads to the third hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Asset prices in multi-period markets are higher than 
corresponding asset prices in single period markets. 
 
In the present experiment there are two single period markets in each session.  One has 
five dividend draws (per asset) and the other has eight dividend draws (per asset).  So 
hypothesis 3 suggests that the multi-period asset price with five (eight) periods remaining 
exceeds the single period asset price with five (eight) draws. 
  Finally, analogous to hypothesis 2, we conjecture that the presence of speculative 
behavior in one dimension (multi-period prices vs. single period prices) is associated with 
the signs of such behavior in another (bubble formation): 
 
Hypothesis 4: The magnitude of the difference between asset prices in 
multi-period markets and single period markets is greater in bubble 
markets than in no-bubble markets. 
 
 
   9
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
 
  Table 2 contains median prices for both assets over all periods during the 12 
experimental sessions.
12  Additionally, median transaction prices for the multi-period 
markets are graphed in Figures 1 and 2.  Notice that Figure 1 contains sessions 1, 3, 6, 7, 
10, and 11; while Figure 2 contains sessions 2, 4, 5, 8, 9, and 12.  Below we will 
dichotomize multi-period markets into “bubble” markets (B) and “no-bubble” markets 
(NB) using several categorization techniques.  As will be described, one of the techniques 
categorizes sessions 1, 3, 6, 7, 10, and 11 as B markets, and the remaining sessions as NB 
markets. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 2] 
 [INSERT FIGURE 1]  
[INSERT FIGURE 2] 
 
Figure 1 shows that, for some sessions, bubble and crash patterns occurred 
somewhat similar to the results widely reported in previous studies.  However, Figure 2 
shows that in other sessions prices of both assets were close to their risk-neutral values 
throughout the ten periods of the multi-period markets. 
 
A.  Test of Hypothesis 1 
  We test Hypothesis 1 using prices observed in the multi-period markets.  Table 3 
reports differences between median prices of the untruncated asset and the truncated asset 
in all ten periods of all 12 sessions.  Differences are reported in both absolute dollar and 
percentage (relative to the untruncated asset price) terms.  Table 3 also reports the p-
values corresponding to a one-tailed Wilcoxon Signed Rank test with the null hypothesis 
that the price difference is zero (and the alternative that the untruncated price is greater 
than the truncated price. 
                                                           
12 Empirical tests are in terms of these median prices.  Nevertheless results are robust to the use of mean 
prices.  From this point on, the term “prices” will refer to median prices.  In the rare cases when no 
transaction occurred, the mid-point of the terminal bid-ask spread is used.   10
[INSERT TABLE 3] 
 
  Consider first, the final three periods.  In the majority of our sessions, there was 
no dividend paid in the first seven periods.  If so, there is no difference between the 
untruncated and the truncated assets in the sense that the restriction on dividends cannot 
bind.  The truncated asset cannot pay more than three times.  But with three periods 
remaining, the untruncated cannot pay more than three times either.  Therefore we would 
not expect to see a price difference in periods 8 through 10.  The data support this.  The 
hypothesis of no difference between the untruncated and truncated cannot be rejected 
(Wilcoxon Signed Rank probabilities are all .500 or higher) for periods eight, nine, or ten. 
  In contrast, we report that the untruncated asset price is higher than the truncated 
for periods one to seven.  A Wilcoxon test that the untruncated price over the first seven 
periods (averaging over the medians for each period) equals the truncated price is 
rejected with p=.183 for dollar differences and p = .046 for percentage differences. 
However, Table three contains datapoint in session 9, period 2 where the percentage 
difference was 1500%, a value several orders of magnitude higher than any other 
percentage difference.  This may be the result of a typing error made by one of the 
subjects.  If this data point is not included in the average of the price differences over 
periods 1-7, the Wilcoxon Signed ranks are as reported above.  Including the value 
changes the p values to .009 for the null that the percentage differences are zero, and .051 
for the null that the dollar differences are zero.  The data corresponding to the 1500% has 
been excluded in the remainder of the analysis. 
Accordingly, the data provide some support for Hypothesis 1.  The price of the 
untruncated asset is generally higher than the price of the truncated asset.  Further, the 
price differences are generally declining over the course of the experiment.  This pattern 
is consistent with the idea that mispricing is more likely when the untruncated asset has 
more dividend draws remaining.  From this we can infer that participants were 
susceptible to irrationality associated with probability judgment error. 
   11
B.  Categorizing markets as bubble or no-bubble markets 
  In order to test the second hypothesis, we must first separate sessions into two 
groups: those with B multi-period markets and those with NB multi-period markets.  We 
use as criteria the four multi-period market summary statistics shown in Table 4.
14  The 
first criterion is the “number of positive periods,” which is the number of periods in each 
session in which the median prices of the two assets exceed their risk-neutral values.  A 
large number of positive periods indicates that trades generally and persistently occur at 
high prices.  The second criterion is the “percent of positive trades,” which is the 
percentage of transactions at prices higher than risk-neutral values.  Depending on the 
distribution of transactions across the ten periods, this criterion may or may not lead to 
the same classification as the first criterion.  The next criterion is the “average price 
deviation,” which is the average across periods of the differences between price and risk-
neutral value in each period.  Again, a high value implies that trades generally and 
persistently occur at too high prices.  The final criterion is a variant of the latter.  Since, 
arguably, price deviations should be normalized by the relevant risk-neutral value, the 
last criterion is the “average scaled price deviation.”
15 
 
[INSERT TABLE 4] 
       
   As a cursory inspection of Table 4 indicates, the first and second criteria lead to 
the same conclusion, which is to classify sessions 1, 3, 6, 7, 10 and 11 as B sessions, and 
the rest as NB sessions.  This classification we call Dichotomization A.  Figures 1 and 2 
reflect this categorization.  The third criterion, however, yields a slightly different result.  
The average price deviation is obviously high in sessions 1, 6, 7 and 10, and low in 
sessions 2, 4, 5, 8 and 12.  Nevertheless, the other three sessions, 3, 9 and 11, are not 
clear-cut, and are thus dropped.  This classification we call Dichotomization B.  Next, 
when the average price deviation is normalized, the only change from Dichotomization B 
                                                           
14 One could also consider single period markets for the purpose of characterizing sessions, but, 
conventionally, when one speaks of a bubble, one means a case where prices are consistently above risk-
neutral value. 
15 Similar bubble measures are used in other papers studying the phenomenon (e.g., Smith, Suchanek and 
Williams (1988) and Ackert, Charupat, Church and Deaves (2005a)).  The reality is that there is no perfect 
measure, which is why we use several dichotomizations.   12
is that session 9 moves from the neither group into the no-bubble group.  This 
classification we call Dichotomization C.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 5] 
       
These dichotomizations are summarized in Table 5. 
 
C.  Test of Hypothesis 2 
 The second hypothesis is tested using the three dichotomizations detailed above.  
Recall that the hypothesis to be tested is that the magnitude of the difference between the 
price of the untruncated asset and the price of the truncated asset is larger in B sessions 
than in NB sessions.  In other words, irrationality with regard to the pricing of lottery-like 
assets is more likely to be associated with asset pricing bubbles.   
 
[INSERT TABLE 6] 
       
Table 6 reports the average difference (in periods 1 through 7) between the 
untruncated and truncated asset prices across sessions classified as either bubble or no-
bubble.  The analysis is repeated for the three dichotomizations described above. The 
average price difference in both dollars and on a percentage basis is larger for bubble 
sessions than for non-bubble sessions regardless of the dichotomization used.  The null 
hypothesis that the difference between the untruncated and truncated asset prices is the 
same in bubble markets as in no-bubble markets is rejected using a pooled t-test with a 
five percent significance level for both dollar and percentage differences for all three 
dichotomizations.  Our results support hypothesis two, providing evidence of correlation 
between the existence of price bubbles and the presence of irrationality associated with 
probability judgment error. 
 
D.  Test of Hypothesis 3 
We now turn to an investigation of whether prices in multi-period markets (with 
eight or five periods remaining) are higher than prices in corresponding single period   13
markets (with eight or five dividend draws).  The multi-period markets are fundamentally 
different from the single period markets because speculation across periods is possible. A 
trader can purchase or sell shares in earlier periods and potentially repurchase or resell 
them in subsequent periods.  The single period markets do not allow speculation across 
periods simply because there are no subsequent periods.
16  Nevertheless, the risk-neutral 
values of the assets in n-draw single period markets are equivalent to those in 
corresponding multi-period markets with n periods remaining.  This is because the 
number of drawings and the probability of a dividend payoff per period is the same in 
both cases.  Observed differences in asset prices are likely due to speculative activity in 
the multi-period markets.  These price differences are shown in Table 7.   
 
[INSERT TABLE 7] 
 
The average MP price is greater than the corresponding SP price in all cases, 
supporting hypothesis three, and indicative of speculative activity in the MP markets.  
Further, Table 7 shows that the price difference (MP-SP) is larger when there are 8 draws 
remaining than when there are 5 draws remaining.  This is also consistent with the 
speculative explanation because it is reasonable to suppose that there is more scope for 
successful speculation when there are more periods remaining. 
 
E.  Test of Hypothesis 4 
Hypothesis 4 also concerns the price differences between the MP market and the 
corresponding SP market.  Table 8 compares the average MP-SP price for each asset in 
bubble sessions to corresponding values in no-bubble sessions.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 8] 
 
Average MP-SP prices are all much greater in bubble sessions, regardless of the 
dichotomization used.  Further, the average MP-SP price difference is greater in bubble 
                                                           
16 Admittedly, in single period markets limited speculation is possible within periods.    14
markets when the asset has eight dividend draws remaining.  These results are again 





Before proceeding to a general discussion of the results, two salient issues must 
be addressed.  First, why are there at most six out of 12 markets that bubble and crash?  
Second, can we be sure that the irrationality being detected is associated with probability 
judgment error?  After discussing these issues we consider what our results say about an 
appropriate theory of bubbles. 
 
A. Relative infrequency of bubbles 
We report bubbles in no more than half of the sessions we conduct.  This is less 
than the frequency reported in similar experiments.  One reason for the discrepancy may 
be the difference in the length of our multi-period markets.  In our experiments, there 
were ten periods, but Smith, Suchanek and Williams (1988) mostly use 15 periods. Porter 
and Smith (1995) use 15 periods as well, and Lei, Noussair and Plott (2001) use 12-, 15- 
and 18-period markets.  Presumably, backward induction is easier in a ten-period setting. 
Since the ability to backwards induct will probably help participants achieve rational 
pricing, markets with fewer periods may be less likely to have bubbles. 
A second possible reason for bubble scarcity may be learning.  Previously cited 
work documents that experimental experience in the same environment moderates price 
bubbles.  In our experiments, subjects may be indirectly learning from the single period 
markets if they are run prior to the multi-period markets.  Each experimental session 
consists of two single period markets and a multi-period market, SP-5, SP-8 and MP-10. 
Our experimental design uses a randomized block to sequence the order of the markets. 
The order in which the markets were conducted is shown in Table 2.  We report (at most) 
six instances of bubbles (sessions 1, 3, 6, 7, 10 and 11).  In sessions 3 and 10, the MP-10 
was conducted first; in sessions 1 and 7, the MP-10 was second; and in sessions 6 and 11, 
the MP-10 was third.  Based on this observation, there is no correlation between the   15
absence or presence of a bubble and the order in which the three markets were conducted.  
Learning does not appear to explain why price bubbles do not form in fully half of our 
sessions. 
Finally, Caginalp, Porter, and Smith (1998, 2000a, 2000b, 2001) suggest that 
price bubbles may increase as the ratio of available cash to available shares increases.  In 
our experiments, the subjects were given $40 that they had to return at the end of the 
session.  In addition, they were told that that they would be excused from their session if 
their cash balance dropped below their guaranteed attendance fee of $15 as of the end of 
each market.  It is possible that the low starting cash and the bankruptcy restriction 
limited the magnitude of the price bubbles in our experiments. 
 
B. Probability judgment error 
We cannot be sure that the observed irrationality, inherent both in bubble 
formation and in the gap between untruncated and truncated asset prices, stems from 
probability judgment error and not from another behavioral bias.  Indeed there are several 
non-mutually exclusive plausible hypotheses that might account for our results.   One 
such possibility is known as the house money effect (Thaler and Johnson (1990)).  After a 
successful dividend payout occurs, asset prices (if already high) may depart further from 
risk-neutral value.  The reason is that, if subjects view wealth earned during the 
experiment differently than wealth earned from other means (e.g., wages), then their risk-
return decisions may differ depending on which sort of wealth is at risk.  Thaler and 
Ziemba (1988) refer to such mental accounts for an explanation of some racetrack betting 
anomalies.  Additionally, Ackert, Charupat, Church and Deaves (2005b) find evidence of 
this effect in an experimental setting.
17 
Examination of our results shows that bubbles occurred more often in the multi-
period markets in sessions where there was a successful dividend draw in either a prior 
single period market and/or in an early period of the multi-period market.  Again, under 
Dichotomization A, we classify six sessions as B markets.  In four of these (1, 6, 7 and 
10), there was a dividend in a prior single period market or a dividend before the third 
                                                           
17  In addition, if subjects (incorrectly) view successive dividend draws as dependent, they believe that the 
probability of another dividend is higher after a recent payout.   The outcome in this case cannot be 
distinguished from that arising with a house money effect.   16
period of the multi-period market, or both.  On the other hand, in four of the six NB 
sessions there was no dividend payout in either the multi-period market or in a prior 
single period market.  Session 5 paid a dividend only after period ten of the multi-period 
market, which clearly could not have influenced prices since the successful draw took 
place after all trading.  Session 12, the final NB session, had a dividend payout in an 
earlier single period market.  Although this session is classified as an NB session, prices 
are not as close to risk-neutral value as in the other NB sessions.  Though we do not 
formally test for a house money effect here, our results indicate that it may play a role in 
explaining the observed behavior. 
It is also possible that non-standard preferences may explain the difference 
between untruncated and truncated asset prices in our experiment.  Barberis and Huang 
(2004) show that under cumulative prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman (1992)), 
investors can overweight the tails of a payoff distribution, causing them to overvalue 
assets whose payoffs are positively skewed.  The more positively skewed a payoff is, the 
higher is the value investors will assign to it.  In our experiment, subjects may have paid 
a premium for the untruncated asset because its payoffs are more positively skewed. 
 
C. What are the origins of bubbles? 
Next we turn to the question of what facilitates bubble formation, and to what 
extent individual irrationality or bias aggregates into market outcomes.  Speculative 
behavior seems to be a force behind experimental bubbles, and we find evidence 
consistent with this.  Yet speculation is not essential.  Lei, Noussair and Plott (2001) 
show that bubbles can form even when a trader cannot profit from speculation by 
undertaking round-trip transactions.  While bubbles can occur without the opportunity to 
speculate, it seems that subject irrationality – whatever its form – is a key ingredient in 
bubble formation. 
Lei, Noussair and Plott (2001) and Lei and Vesely (2004) suggest that subject 
confusion may be the source of the irrationality at the root of laboratory bubbles.   
Bubbles may be found in markets with decision errors due to subject confusion about the 
instructions, the nature of the market, or because there is no alternative activity.   While 
not contradicting this, our results add to the experimental literature by showing that   17
another sort of irrationality may as well be linked to bubbles.  Bubbles may also be found 
in markets with decision errors due to behavioral biases such as probability judgment 
error. 
  Linking behavioral bias and bubbles raises additional issues regarding subject 
heterogeneity and interactions.  In some circumstances, individual biases seem to 
aggregate into markets prices, but in other circumstances this does not occur. Gneezy, 
Kapteyn and Potters (2003; page 823) investigate myopic loss aversion as an explanation 
of the equity premium puzzle and argue that “individual violations of standard expected 
utility theory do not necessarily imply that market outcomes will violate expected utility 
theory.”  Yet they document myopic loss aversion at the level of the market.  Kluger and 
Wyatt (2004) investigate probability judgment error via the Monty Hall problem, and 
find that the bias disappears in markets even if a minority of the traders exhibit immunity 
to this bias as measured by individual-level tests.  Extending this to irrationality 
discovered in laboratory bubble markets, it is likely that the formation and magnitude of 
bubbles is sensitive to both the mix of rational and irrational traders and their interaction.  
Unfortunately, the nature of our design does not allow us to make conclusions about this 
issue.  Nevertheless, we establish that aggregate irrationality measured in one dimension 
(probability judgment error) is associated with aggregate irrationality measured in 
another (bubble formation).  Looking ahead, future research might be designed to relate 




In some, but not all, of the twelve sessions conducted for this experiment, we 
observe a bubble pattern in the prices of both assets.  Bubbles occur more frequently in 
sessions where there is a large difference between the prices of the untruncated and the 
truncated assets.  This is consistent with irrationality associated with probability 
judgment error.  Additionally, our paper provides evidence that speculative activity, as 
well as irrationality, is present in bubble markets.  Such effects can be identified by 
comparing prices in single period markets to corresponding prices in multi-period 
markets.  When bubbles occur, single period prices tend to be lower than corresponding   18
multi-period market prices.  Therefore, our results also support the view that speculation 
is an ingredient of laboratory asset price bubbles.   19
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Panel A: Expected total dividends for each asset 
Truncated Asset 






Asset  (0)  (1)  (2)  (3 or more) 
10 $4.00  $4.00      
9 $3.60  $3.60  $3.59     
8 $3.20  $3.20  $3.19  $2.98   
7 $2.80  $2.80  $2.79  $2.64  $0 
6 $2.40  $2.40  $2.40  $2.28  $0 
5 $2.00  $2.00  $2.00  $1.92  $0 
4 $1.60  $1.60  $1.60  $1.55  $0 
3 $1.20  $1.20  $1.20  $1.18  $0 
2 $0.80  $0.80  $0.80  $0.79  $0 
1 $0.40  $0.40  $0.40  $0.40  $0 
 
 
Panel B: Probability distributions for total dividends for each type of asset with 
eight draws remaining and five draws 
8 Draws  5 Draws  5 Draws 






Asset  Asset Asset Asset 
0 0.850763023  0.85076302  0.903920797  0.903920797 
$20 0.138900085  0.138900085  0.092236816  0.092236816 
$40 0.009921435  0.009921435  0.003764768  0.003764768 
$60 0.000404957  0.000415457  0.000076832  0.000077619 
$80 0.000010331    0.000000784   
$100 0.000000169    0.000000003   
$120 0.000000002       
$140 <0.000000001       
$160 <0.000000001       TABLE 2: Median Asset Prices 
The table reports median asset prices for all markets in all sessions. The midpoint of the bid-ask spread is reported for periods with no transactions.   An asterisk 
signifies that the asset paid a $20 dividend at the end of the corresponding period.  A pound sign signifies that there was no trading in the relevant period, so price 
is expressed as the midpoint in the bid-ask spread.  The markets are reported in the same order as they were administered. 
  Draws  Remaining  10  9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
Session  Expected  Value  4.00 3.60 3.20 2.80 2.40 2.00 1.60 1.20 0.80 0.40 
1  Untruncated  SP-5        8.50*      
1  Truncated  SP-5        8.50      
1  Untruncated  MP-10  10.00  9.99 8.00 7.88  9.58#  9.16  8.85#  8.50 4.50 3.00 
1  Truncated  MP-10  7.50 9.00  5.20*  7.98 7.50 7.30 6.75 6.50 4.00 1.50 
1  Untruncated  SP-8     7.75         
1  Truncated SP-8        5.00                      
2  Untruncated  SP-8     2.87         
2  Truncated  SP-8     2.60         
2  Untruncated  MP-10  2.20 2.38 2.38 2.28 1.60 1.00 1.00 1.11 1.30 1.60 
2  Truncated  MP-10  2.00 2.36 2.40 2.30 1.85 1.00 0.95 1.20 1.50  1.98# 
2  Untruncated  SP-5        0.21      
2  Truncated SP-5                 0.27             
3  Untruncated  MP-10  5.00 6.60 7.00 4.00 2.45 2.60 3.00 2.30 1.50 0.48 
3  Truncated  MP-10  3.10 7.85 4.00 3.50 2.75 2.70 2.71 3.00 1.55 0.50 
3  Untruncated  SP-5        1.25      
3  Truncated  SP-5        1.80      
3  Untruncated  SP-8     0.68         
3  Truncated SP-8        0.60                      
4  Untruncated  MP-10  4.50 3.60 2.98 2.57 2.30 1.35 0.32 0.45 0.31 0.18 
4  Truncated  MP-10  4.25 3.25 2.75 2.56 2.20 1.28 0.40 0.40 0.35 0.18 
4  Untruncated  SP-8     0.33         
4  Truncated  SP-8     0.30         
4  Untruncated  SP-5        0.31      
4  Truncated SP-5                 0.30             
5  Untruncated  SP-8     3.50         
5  Truncated  SP-8     3.50         
5  Untruncated  SP-5        1.67      
5  Truncated  SP-5        2.00      
5  Untruncated  MP-10  2.00 1.75 1.65 1.59 1.50 1.46 1.35 1.20 0.65  0.16* 
5  Truncated  MP-10  1.90 1.40 1.50 1.45  1.55#  1.35 1.20 0.95 0.50 0.29 TABLE 2 Continued 
 
  Draws  Remaining  10  9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
Session  Expected  Value  4.00 3.60 3.20 2.80 2.40 2.00 1.60 1.20 0.80 0.40 
6  Untruncated  SP-5        4.00      
6  Truncated  SP-5        5.00*      
6  Untruncated  SP-8     4.80         
6  Truncated  SP-8     5.00         
6  Untruncated  MP-10  5.10 5.20 4.98 4.85 4.95 4.85 4.98 4.55 3.49 0.56 
6  Truncated  MP-10  5.05 5.13 4.88 4.88 4.90 4.85 4.79 4.55 2.31 0.60 
7  Untruncated  SP-5        6.00      
7  Truncated  SP-5        8.00      
7  Untruncated  MP-10  6.90 7.00 7.55 7.05 6.10 5.10 5.32 5.10 2.67 0.32 
7  Truncated  MP-10  6.05 5.65 6.60 6.50 6.10 6.00 5.40 5.20 3.20 0.23 
7  Untruncated  SP-8     1.15         
7  Truncated SP-8        1.00                      
8  Untruncated  SP-8     3.10         
8  Truncated  SP-8     4.20         
8  Untruncated  MP-10  4.00 3.70 3.04 2.81 2.21 2.00 1.25 1.18 1.11 0.78 
8  Truncated  MP-10  3.95 3.75 3.01 2.75 2.24 1.93 1.27 1.18 1.10 1.10 
8  Untruncated  SP-5        0.58      
8  Truncated SP-5                 0.25             
9  Untruncated  MP-10  20.00  8.00 3.00 2.00 1.45 0.93 0.73 0.59 0.30 0.19 
9  Truncated  MP-10  24.00  0.50 1.75 2.80 1.40 0.85 1.38 0.70  0.48#  0.24 
9  Untruncated  SP-5        0.17      
9  Truncated  SP-5        0.20      
9  Untruncated  SP-8     0.26         
9  Truncated SP-8        0.25                      
10  Untruncated  MP-10  22.70 18.00 11.00 12.00 13.50 11.50 10.01      4.95#  2.10  1.20 
10  Truncated  MP-10  19.99 16.50  12.00* 6.50  10.99 11.00 10.01 6.20*  2.30  1.23 
10  Untruncated  SP-8     2.97         
10  Truncated  SP-8     3.95         
10  Untruncated  SP-5        1.00      
10  Truncated SP-5                 1.09             
 TABLE 2 Continued 
   
  Draws  Remaining  10  9  8 7  6 5 4 3 2 1 
Session  Expected  Value  4.00 3.60  3.20 2.80  2.40 2.00 1.60 1.20 0.80 0.40 
11  Untruncated  SP-8     10.00          
11  Truncated  SP-8     4.50*          
11  Untruncated  SP-5          6.00      
11  Truncated  SP-5          5.50      
11  Untruncated  MP-10  4.35 3.62  3.98 4.00  4.24 2.00 3.70 3.35 1.68 1.00 
11  Truncated  MP-10  7.00 4.10  3.78 3.97  4.00 3.92 3.40 3.00 1.61 1.00 
12  Untruncated  SP-5          4.25      
12  Truncated  SP-5          3.75      
12  Untruncated  SP-8     1.25*          
12  Truncated  SP-8     1.10          
12  Untruncated  MP-10  1.88 2.60  1.95 1.56  1.64 2.82 1.59 1.51 1.25 0.55 
12  Truncated  MP-10  5.00 2.63  1.45 1.50  1.62 1.63 1.60 1.61 1.28 0.45 
 
 TABLE 3: Untruncated and Truncated Asset Price Differences 
Panel A shows the difference between untruncated (asset A) and truncated (asset B) asset prices for all periods (1-10) over all 12 multi-period markets.  Panel B 
shows the percentage differences.  Median prices are used for both assets.  Averages of the median price differences are reported both across sessions, and across 
the first seven periods.  When no trading occurs, the average of the terminal bid and ask is used. The p-value corresponds to a one-tailed Wilcoxon Signed-Rank 
test with the null hypothesis that the Untruncated Price equals the Truncated Price. 
 
Panel A:  Dollar difference between median asset prices: Untruncated Price – Truncated Price 
Session  Period 1  Period 2  Period 3  Period 4  Period 5  Period 6  Period 7  Period 8  Period 9  Period 10  Avg. 1-7 
1  2.50 0.99 2.80 -0.10 2.08 1.86 2.10 2.00 0.50 1.50  1.75 
2  0.20 0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.25 0.00 0.05 -0.09 -0.20 -0.38  0.00 
3  1.90 -1.25 3.00 0.50 -0.30 -0.10 0.29 -0.70 -0.05 -0.02  0.58 
4  0.25 0.35 0.23 0.01 0.10 0.07 -0.08 0.05 -0.04 0.00  0.13 
5  0.10 0.35 0.15 0.14 -0.05 0.11 0.15 0.25 0.15 -0.13  0.14 
6  0.05 0.07 0.10 -0.03 0.05 0.00 0.19 0.00 1.18 -0.04  0.06 
7  0.85 1.35 0.95 0.55 0.00 -0.90  -0.08  -0.10  -0.53 0.09  0.39 
8  0.05 -0.05 0.03 0.06 -0.03 0.07 -0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.32  0.02 
9  -4.00 7.50 1.25 -0.80 0.05 0.08 -0.65 -0.11 -0.18 -0.05  0.49 
10  2.71 1.50 -1.00 5.50 2.51 0.50 0.00 -1.25 -0.20 -0.03  1.67 
11  -2.65  -0.48 0.20 0.03 0.24 -1.92 0.30 0.35 0.07 0.00  -0.61 
12  -3.12  -0.03 0.50 0.06 0.02 1.19 -0.01  -0.10  -0.03 0.10  -0.20 
Average  -0.10 0.86 0.68 0.49 0.37 0.08 0.19 0.03 0.06 0.06  0.37 
p-value 0.304 0.085 0.010 0.122 0.206 0.271 0.176 0.624 0.641 0.722  0.051 
 TABLE 3 Continued 
 
Panel B:  Percentage difference between median asset prices: (Untruncated Price – Truncated Price) / Truncated Price 
Session  Period 1  Period 2  Period 3  Period 4  Period 5  Period 6  Period 7  Period 8  Period 9  Period 10  Avg. 1-7 
1  33.3% 11.0% 53.8% -1.3% 27.7% 25.5% 31.1% 30.8% 12.5%  100.0%  25.9% 
2  10.0%  0.8%  -0.8%  -0.9% -13.5% 0.0%  5.3%  -7.5% -13.3%  -19.2%  0.1% 
3  61.3% -15.9% 75.0% 14.3% -10.9% -3.7%  10.7% -23.3% -3.2%  -4.0%  18.7% 
4  5.9% 10.8% 8.4%  0.4%  4.5%  5.5% -20.0%  12.5%  -11.4% 0.0%  2.2% 
5  5.3%  25.0% 10.0%  9.7%  -3.2%  8.1%  12.5% 26.3% 30.0% -44.8%  9.6% 
6  1.0% 1.4% 2.0% -0.6% 1.0% 0.0% 4.0% 0.0%  51.1%  -6.7%  1.3% 
7 14.0%  23.9%  14.4%  8.5%  0.0%  -15.0%  -1.5%  -1.9%  -16.6%  39.1%  6.3% 
8  1.3% -1.3% 1.0% 2.2% -1.3% 3.6% -1.6% 0.0% 0.9%  -29.1%  0.5% 
9 -16.7%  1500.0%  71.4%  -28.6%  3.6%  9.4%  -47.1% -15.7% -37.5% -20.8%  213.2% 
10  13.6% 9.1% -8.3% 84.6%  22.8% 4.5%  0.0% -20.2%  -8.7% -2.4%  18.0% 
11  -37.9%  -11.7% 5.3%  0.8%  6.0% -49.0% 8.8% 11.7% 4.3%  0.0%  -11.1% 
12  -62.0% -1.1% 34.5% 4.0%  1.2% 73.0% -0.6% -6.2% -2.3% 22.2%  7.0% 
Average  2.4% 129.3%  22.2%  7.8%  3.2%  5.2% 0.1% 0.5% 0.5% 2.9%  24.3% 
p-value  0.253 0.098 0.005 0.089 0.207 0.166 0.281 0.500 0.625 0.615  0.009 TABLE 4: Statistics Pertaining to the Presence of Bubbles in the MP Markets 
The number of positive periods is the number of periods where the median price is greater than the risk-
neutral value.  The number of positive trades is the total number of trades where the price exceeds risk-
neutral value, and the percent of positive trades is the number of positive trades divided by the total number 
of transactions.  The average median price deviation is the average across periods of the differences 
between the median price and the risk-neutral value in each period.  Average scaled price deviation 
averages across periods the differences between the median price and the risk neutral value normalized by 














1 Untruncated  10  96%  5.75  3.49 
1 Truncated  10  97%  4.12  2.40 
2 Untruncated  2  9%  -0.52  0.11 
2 Truncated  2  16%  -0.45  0.24 
3 Untruncated  10  90%  1.29  0.59 
3 Truncated  9  87%  0.97  0.53 
4 Untruncated  1  23%  -0.35  -0.30 
4 Truncated  1  9%  -0.44  -0.32 
5 Untruncated  0  9%  -0.87  -0.35 
5 Truncated  0  5%  -0.99  -0.39 
6 Untruncated  10  100%  2.15  1.31 
6 Truncated  10  100%  1.99  1.16 
7 Untruncated  9  89%  3.11  1.54 
7 Truncated  9  85%  2.89  1.53 
8 Untruncated  4  37%  0.01  0.10 
8 Truncated  3  38%  0.03  0.17 
9 Untruncated  2  29%  1.52  0.17 
9 Truncated  1  24%  1.21  0.13 
10 Untruncated  10  100%  8.50  3.58 
10 Truncated  10  92%  7.47  3.31 
11 Untruncated  9  91%  0.99  0.72 
11 Truncated  10  95%  1.38  0.82 
12 Untruncated  4  33%  -0.47  -0.04 
12 Truncated  4  30%  -0.32  -0.05  
TABLE 5: Different Dichotomizations of Bubble vs. No-Bubble Sessions 
This table shows which sessions fall into bubble and no-bubble categories using the four dichotomizations 








A  1, 3, 6, 7, 10, 11  2, 4, 5, 8, 9, 12 
B  1, 6, 7, 10  2, 4, 5, 8, 12 
C  1, 6, 7, 10  2, 4, 5, 8, 9, 12 
 TABLE 6: Price Differences and Bubbles 
The average price difference is the median untruncated price – median truncated price first averaged across 
periods one to seven of a session, and then averaged across sessions classified as either bubble or no-
bubble.  The average percentage price difference is the median (untruncated price – median truncated 
price)/truncated price first averaged across periods one to seven of a session, and then averaged across 
sessions classified as either bubble or no-bubble.  Three methods of classifying sessions are used.  The 
Pooled t p-value is the p-value from a one tailed pooled t test with the null that the price difference in the 
bubble sessions equals the price difference in the no bubble sessions.  The Wilcoxon Rank Sum p-value is 
the p-value from the corresponding one-tailed non-parametric hypothesis test with the same null. 
 
Dichotomization A  Bubble Sessions  No Bubble Sessions    
Average Price Difference  0.64  -0.10   
Pooled t p-value      0.046 
Wilcoxon Rank Sum p-value        0.047 
Average Percentage Price Difference 9.90%  0.72%   
Pooled t p-value      0.098 
Wilcoxon Rank Sum p-value        0.120 
Number of Sessions  6  6   
           
Dichotomization B  Bubble Sessions  No Bubble Sessions    
Average Price Difference  0.97  0.02   
Pooled t p-value      0.022 
Wilcoxon Rank Sum p-value        0.032 
Average Percentage Price Difference 12.88%  3.88%   
Pooled t p-value      0.068 
Wilcoxon Rank Sum p-value        0.143 
Number of Sessions  4  5    
           
Dichotomization C  Bubble Sessions  No Bubble Sessions    
Average Price Difference  0.97  -0.10   
Pooled t p-value      0.011 
Wilcoxon Rank Sum p-value        0.019 
Average Percentage Price Difference 12.88%  0.72%   
Pooled t p-value      0.044 
Wilcoxon Rank Sum p-value        0.086 
Number of Sessions  4  6    TABLE 7: Comparing Multi-period Prices and Single Period Prices 
Each session consists of two single period markets and a multi-period market, SP-5, SP-8 and MP-10.  
(MP-10)-(SP-8) is the difference between the median price in the third period of the MP-10 market and the 
SP-8 market median price.  Both of these are prices of the asset with eight remaining dividend drawings. 
(MP-10)-(SP-5) is the difference between the median price in the sixth period of the MP-10 market and the 
SP-5 market median price.  Both of these are prices of the asset with five remaining dividend drawings.  
The paired t p-value is the p value from a one-tailed paired t-test with the null hypothesis that the price in 
the MP market equals the price in the SP market.  The Wilcoxon p-value is the result of the corresponding 
one-tailed Wilcoxon Signed Rank test with the same null hypothesis 
 
  (MP-10)-(SP-8) (MP-10)-(SP-8) (MP-10)-(SP-5) (MP-10)-(SP-5) 
Session Untruncated  Truncated Untruncated Truncated 
1 $0.25  $0.20  $0.66  -$1.20 
2 -0.50  -0.20  0.79  0.73 
3 6.33  3.40  1.35  0.90 
4 2.65  2.45  1.05  0.98 
5  -1.85 -2.00 -0.22 -0.65 
6  0.18 -0.13 0.85 -0.15 
7 6.40  5.60  -0.90  -2.00 
8 -0.06  -1.19  1.43  1.68 
9 2.74  1.50  0.77  0.65 
10 8.03  8.06  10.50  9.91 
11  -6.02 -0.73 -4.00 -1.59 
12 0.70  0.35  -1.43  -2.12 
All Sessions  1.57  1.44  0.90  0.60 
Paired t p-value  .097  .061  .188  .266 
Wilcoxon p-value  .076  .105  .196  .508 
 
 
  TABLE 8: Comparing Multi-period Prices and Single Period Prices 
Each session consists of two single period markets and a multi-period market, SP-5, SP-8 and MP-10.  The sessions were classified as Bubble (B) or No Bubble 
(NB) according to three dichotomizations.  (MP-10)-(SP-8) is the difference between the median price in the third period of the MP-10 market and the SP-8 
market median price.  Both of these are prices of the asset with eight remaining dividend drawings. (MP-10)-(SP-5) is the difference between the median price in 
the sixth period of the MP-10 market and the SP-5 market median price.  Both of these are prices of the asset with five remaining dividend drawings.  The pooled 
t p-value is the result of a one-tailed hypothesis test with a null that the MP-SP in bubble sessions is the same ad the MP-SP in the no-bubble sessions.  The 
Wilcoxon Rank Sum p-value corresponds to one-tailed non-parametric tests with the same null hypothesis. 
 
  MP10-SP8 MP10-SP8    MP10-SP5 MP10-SP5 
   Bubble Sessions  No Bubble Sessions     Bubble Sessions  No Bubble Sessions 
Dichotomization  A         
Untruncated  Asset  2.53 0.61    1.41 0.40 
Truncated  Asset  2.57 0.15    0.98 0.21 
Pooled  t  p-value  0.213  0.070  0.315  0.273 
Wilcoxon Rank Sum p-value  0.197  0.120    0.531  0.468 
Number of Sessions  6  6     6  6 
Dichotomization  B         
Untruncated  Asset  3.72 0.19    2.78 0.32 
Truncated Asset  3.43  -0.12    1.64  0.12 
Pooled  t  p-value  0.060  0.058  0.167  0.286 
Wilcoxon Rank Sum p-value  0.095  0.095    0.452  0.452 
Number of Sessions  4  5     4  5 
Dichotomization  C         
Untruncated  Asset  3.72 0.61    2.78 0.40 
Truncated  Asset  3.43 0.15    1.64 0.21 
Pooled  t  p-value  0.067  0.054  0.148  0.277 
Wilcoxon Rank Sum p-value  0.129  0.129    0.457  0.381 
Number of Sessions  4  6     4  6 
 FIGURE 1: Price Paths for Multi-period Markets that Exhibit Bubble Pattern 
under Dichotomization A (Sessions 1, 3, 6, 7, 10, and 11) 
These price paths show median prices (averaged over assets A and B) each period during 
sessions 1, 3, 6, 7, 10 and 11, which are categorized as bubble sessions using 
Dichotomization A.  When no trading occurs, the average of the terminal bid and ask is 






















































 FIGURE 2 
Price Paths for Multi-period Markets that Do Not Exhibit Bubble Pattern under 
Dichotomization 1 (Sessions 2, 4, 5, 8, 9, and 12) 
These price paths show median prices (averaged over assets A and B) each period during 
sessions 2, 4, 5, 8, 9, and 12, which are categorized as no-bubble sessions using 
Dichotomization A.  When no trading occurs, the average of the terminal bid and ask is 
used.  Risk-neutral price path (IV) is provided as referent. 
 












































































































 Appendix 1 




1.a. The nature of the session.  The experimental session 
that you are participating in today is concerned with the 
economics of market decision-making.  We are going to 
simulate a market environment in which you will buy and sell 
shares of two different stocks.  Based on your decisions you 
will be able to generate profits.  These profits will be 
paid to you in cash at the conclusion of this experiment.   
 
1.b. Three trials. Trading will occur during three different 
and distinct trials.  One trial will take place over a 
sequence of 10 periods.  Two other trials will take place 
over a single period.  In the first three sections of these 
Instructions we will focus on the 10-period trial.  In 
section 4 we will highlight the few differences between the 
10-period trial and the two single-period trials.  Your 
total earnings will be the sum of your earnings during these 
three trials plus a $15 attendance fee.  If your cumulative 
earnings are negative you will lose this attendance fee 
dollar for dollar.  The order in which these three trials 
will be conducted will be revealed as the market simulation 
progresses.   
 
1.c. What materials should you have?  In addition to these 
instructions, please make sure that you have received an 
"Introduction to the Session" and a consent form (which you 
should immediately read and sign if you agree to 
participate).  Please refer to these materials while we go 
through the instructions with you.  In addition, you can use 




2. Market Setup and General Trading 
Instructions 
 
2.a. Periods.  Trading will be conducted using the 
computerized Financial Trading System.  There will be a 
series of 10 periods.  Each period lasts five minutes.  An 
experimenter will announce the beginning and end of each 
period.  Your trading screen will continuously keep track of 
the time remaining (in seconds) in each period. Instructions for Trading Session  2
2.b. Getting started.  Your computer has already been 
started up and you have been logged in under the name ‘PCxx’ 
where ‘xx’ is the number you have been assigned.  As a 
result, your anonymity is ensured.   
 
2.c. Endowment.  At the beginning of the first period, every 
trader will be provided with the same endowment, which 
consists of $40 in cash and 2 shares each of Stock A and 
Stock B.  This endowment will be shown on your trading 
screen before trading commences.  Your compensation for 
participating in this experiment will depend on how well you 
do relative to this starting endowment.  Note that at the 
conclusion of trading in this trial you will be required to 
return the endowment of $40. 
 
2.d. Trading.  When trading starts in each period, you may 
sell part or all of your holdings of shares.  You may 
alternatively use your cash endowment to purchase more 
shares.  You may also decide to do no trading and hold on to 
the shares that you have at the start of the period.  The 
procedure that you need to use if you wish to conduct a 
trade is explained in the ‘Market Organization and Trading 
Rules’ section below.   
 
2.e. Selling and buying shares.  Sales of your share 
holdings increase your cash balance by the amount of the 
sale price.  Similarly, purchases reduce your cash balance 
by the amount of the purchase price.  Thus, you can gain or 
lose money on the purchase and sale of shares.  The trading 
system will automatically update your cash balance and share 
holdings to reflect your purchases and/or sales of shares. 
 
2.f. Tracking prices.  By double-clicking on the stock name 
in the Book Window, you will be shown a graph that tracks 
the bid/ask/transaction price history for the relevant 
security over the current period.  The bid price will be 
displayed in red, the ask price in blue, and the transaction 
price in yellow.  This graph will refresh itself at the 
beginning of each period.  At the end of each period an 
experimenter will verbally announce the closing price (i.e., 
last trade) for each stock.  In addition he will write these 
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2.g. Dividends.  At the end of each period, stock A and 
stock B will pay dividends.  An experimenter will announce 
and write these values on the whiteboard.  For each stock, 
the amount of the dividend per share can be $0 or $20.  
These two possible values will be randomly determined by 
blindly drawing a chip from a plastic jar.  Additional 
details concerning the possible dividends are given in the 
'Dividends' section below. 
 
2.h. Calculating dividends.  At the end of each period, the 
actual dividend amount for each stock will be revealed on 
your trading screen.  The total dividends that you will 
receive from each stock in a period are computed by 
multiplying the dividend per share for that stock by the 
number of shares of the stock that you hold at the end of 
the period.  Suppose, for example, that you hold 2 shares of 
stock A at the end of period 1.  If for that period the 
dividend per share is $20.00, then your total dividends from 
stock A in the period would be 2 x $20.00 = $40.00.  This 
number will be added automatically by the trading system to 
your cash balance at the end of each period.  If the 
dividend per share is $0, your cash balance will not change 
due to dividends. 
 
2.i. Source of trading profits.  As a result, your trading 
profits in a given period come from two sources - from (i) 
dividends on all shares you hold at the end of the period; 
and (ii) gains and losses from purchasing and selling 
shares. 
 
2.j. Carry forward.  The cash balance and shares that you 
have at the end of one period will be carried forward to the 
next period, during which you are again free to trade the 
shares.  Notice that if you choose to hold a share over 
several periods, then you will be entitled to the random 
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2.k. Final period.  At the end of the final period (period 
10), the shares you hold will pay their final dividends and 
then cease to exist.  Your trading screen will display your 
final cash balance.  Your final earnings will therefore be 
equal to your final cash balance (shown on your screen at 
the end) minus the original cash endowment of $40.  You will 
be paid this amount in cash immediately after the experiment 
ends.  Note that if your final cash balance is less than the 
original cash endowment, you will earn nothing from this 
trial.  Also, note that, because you are also originally 
endowed with two shares of each stock, which you can sell 
for cash, or hold on to for their dividends, your final cash 





3.a. Dividend determination.  For each stock, there are two 
possible dividends: $0 and $20.  At the end of each period, 
the dividends for stocks A and B are randomly determined, 
subject to the following constraint.  If stock B pays three 
dividends of $20, the dividends for stock B will be $0 in 
all remaining periods.  Otherwise, the amount of the 
dividend for each stock is determined by blindly drawing a 
chip from a plastic jar.  This drawing is done separately 
for each stock (first for A and then for B), and the first 
chip drawn (the one for A) will be replaced before the 
second drawing (for B) occurs.  The jar contains 100 chips; 
98 are red; and the other 2 are also red but have been 
marked with black circles on each side.  That is to say, of 
these 100 chips, 98 are red and two are marked black.  For 
each drawing, the experimenter will ask a participant to 
blindly draw a chip from the jar.  (We will give all 
subjects several opportunities.)  If a red chip is drawn the 
dividend is $0 and if a black chip is drawn the dividend is 
$20. 
  
3.b. Expected dividends. One can easily calculate that the 
expected value of Stock A's dividend per period is $0.40.  
The expected value of Stock B’s dividend per period is also 
$0.40, if the stock is still paying dividends (that is, if 
it has paid out less than 3 dividends in prior periods).  At 
the end of each period, an experimenter will announce the 
expected total remaining dividends for the two stocks and 
the maximum total remaining dividends.  Notice that because 
Stock B pays a maximum of 3 dividends, the expected total 
dividends for B are always less than or equal to the maximum 
total remaining dividends for A. Instructions for Trading Session  5
 
3.c. Dividend independence.  As stated above, the amount of 
the dividend for each stock in a given period is determined 
by separate draws from the jar.  After drawing a chip, the 
chip is always returned to the jar before any additional 
draws. Thus, the dividend for each stock is determined 
independently of both past amounts and independently of the 
dividend for the other stock.   
 
4. Two single-period markets 
 
4.a. Single-period but with same endowment.  While the 10-
period trial occurs over 10 periods with stocks and cash 
carried over between periods, the single-period trials occur 
over only one period.  (Periods continue to be 5 minutes in 
duration.)  In the case of both single-period trials, the 
endowment is identical to the 10-period endowment.  That is, 
you begin with $40 (which must be returned) and two shares 
of Stock A and two shares of Stock B. 
 
4.b. Dividends – Multiple draws.  Dividend determination 
will occur in a similar fashion with students drawing chips.  
There is one essential difference.  In one of these single-
period trials, the one and only dividend for each stock will 
be determined by drawing with replacement five chips from 
the jar.  In the other, the one and only dividend for each 
stock will be determined by drawing with replacement eight 
chips from the jar.  Each black chip drawn will be worth 
$20.  For example, using Stock A, if for the 8-chip draw 4 
black chips are drawn, the dividend is $80/share.  It is 
important to note that, just as in the case of the 10-period 
trial, a maximum of three $20 draws are permitted for Stock 
B.  This means that, using Stock B now, as soon as 3 black 




5. Market Organization and Trading 
Rules 
 
5.a. Possible actions.  If you wish to conduct a trade, you 
can do so by taking one or more of the following four 
actions: 1/place a bid; 2/place an ask; 3/buy; and 4/sell. 
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5.b. Placing orders.  To take these actions, you must 
utilize your main FTS Trader window.  When you look at it 
you will see that there are four sub-windows.  First note 
that you only input information (orders) into the top middle 
sub-window which we call the ‘Order Window.’  Also important 
is the lower sub-window which we call the ‘Book Window.’  To 
place an order you must specify which stock the order is 
for.  You do this by first clicking on the name of the stock 
(in the Book Window) in which you wish to conduct a trade.  
You will see the name of the stock is then indicated above 
the Order Window after you have clicked on it.  There are 
two cells that now potentially should be filled in.  First 
for a bid or ask the price cell should be filled in.  
Second, for all orders (bids, asks, buys and sells) a 
quantity of ‘1’ needs to be filled in.  This is because in 
this experiment all orders must be for one share. 
 
5.c. Placing a bid.  By placing a bid, you inform the market 
that you wish to purchase a share of a specified stock at a 
specified unit price.  For example, if you wish to buy a 




and click on ‘Bid’ in your Order Window.  (You must also 
have first selected a quantity of ‘1.’)  You are, however, 
prohibited from entering a bid whose purchase price exceeds 
your current cash balance. 
  
5.d. Display of best bid.  The Book Window will display only 
the bid order with the highest price.  Bettered bids are 
replaced and cease to exist.  To see the identity of the 
trader posting the best bid (you certainly will want to know 
if it is your order), you can double-click on the stock 
name.  Doing so reveals a new window, which includes a graph 
that shows the evolution of bids, asks and transaction 
prices during the period. 
 
5.e. Order cancellation.  To cancel your bid, click on 
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5.f. Selling shares.  When you observe the highest bid for a 
stock and if you have a share of that stock to sell, you are 
free to accept or not accept that highest bid.  To accept 
it, you have to enter the number of shares, which you must 
set at ‘1,’ in the Order Window and click on ‘Sell.’  You 
should not specify a price.  If you do so the sale will not 
occur.  After you have put in the order your sale will be 
immediately executed at the bid price.  You are prohibited 
from submitting a sell order if you do not hold the 
security.  
 
5.g. Placing an ask.  On the other hand, if you wish to sell 
but are not satisfied with the observed bid price, you can 
place an ask into the trading system.  Once again a price 
has to be specified.  Also, once again, the number of shares 
must be set at ‘1.’  After these things are done you must 
click on ‘Ask’ in your Order Window.  You are prohibited 
from submitting an ask order if you do not own a share.  
Again, to delete your ask, you can click on ‘Clear Asks.’   
 
5.h. Buying shares.  If you wish to buy at the lowest ask 
price, you have to enter ‘1’ and click on ‘Buy’ in the Order 
Window.  Again note that you should not specify the price.  
The buy order will be immediately executed at the ask price.  
Again, traders are prohibited from buying more shares than 
they have the cash balance for. 
 
5.i. Updating of cash and share holdings.  After a trade is 
executed, the trading system will immediately update your 
cash balance and share holdings and display them on the 
screen.  At the end of each period, your screen will also 
show your cash balance and share holdings, which will then 
be carried forward to the beginning of the following period 
(assuming there is more than one period in the trial).   
 
5.j. Final period.   At the end of the final period – period 
10 for one trial and period 1 for two other trials, the 
trading system will display the final cash balance and also 
calculate your earnings.  Your trading profit for the trial 
in question is calculated as the cash balance you see on 
your screen minus the $40 initial cash endowment.  (This 
could be a negative number, and if the sum of your earnings 
from all three trials is negative, your attendance fee will 
be reduced dollar for dollar.) 
 TRIAL ____ – KEY FACTS 
 
Number of periods: 10 
 
Cash endowment: $40 
 
Endowment of A shares: 2 
 
Endowment of B shares: 2 
 
Dividends: After each period a single draw 
occurs for each stock.  A black chip pays out a 
$20 dividend; a red chip pays out no dividend.  
Recall there are 98 red chips and 2 black. 
 
NOTE: A shares can receive as many $20 
dividends as there are periods.  B shares can 
at most receive three $20 dividends. TRIAL ____ – KEY FACTS 
 
Number of periods: 1 
 
Cash endowment: $40 
 
Endowment of A shares: 2 
 
Endowment of B shares: 2 
 
Dividends: After the only period of the trial, 8 
draws will be done for each stock.  Each 
black chip pays out a $20 dividend; each red 
chip pays out no dividend.  Recall there are 98 
red chips and 2 black. 
 
NOTE: A shares can receive as many $20 
dividends as there are draws, so the maximum 
dividend for A is $160.  B shares can at most 
receive three $20 dividends, or $60. TRIAL ____ – KEY FACTS 
 
Number of periods: 1 
 
Cash endowment: $40 
 
Endowment of A shares: 2 
 
Endowment of B shares: 2 
 
Dividends: After the only period of the trial, 5 
draws will be done for each stock.  Each 
black chip pays out a $20 dividend; each red 
chip pays out no dividend.  Recall there are 98 
red chips and 2 black. 
 
NOTE: A shares can receive as many $20 
dividends as there are draws, so the maximum 
dividend for A is $100.  B shares can at most 
receive three $20 dividends, or $60. 
 
 